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Abstract. In this paper we revise the psychic distance postulate of the Uppsala Model (Johanson and Vahlne,
1977, 1990) by injecting more recent ﬁndings (i.e., distinguishing between selection of foreign markets and
time needed to achieve sufﬁcient penetration in foreign markets and the role of social capital). The model
we propose posits that a higher psychic distance decreases the speed of market penetration. On distant
markets, internationalizing technology-based ventures need more time to establish a position in the foreign
network and to obtaining positive cash ﬂow. Our model presents social capital as a mean to overcome the
psychic distance and to increase the speed of market penetration. We build our model on four case studies
on technology-based new ventures internationalizing at very early ages.
Keywords: Uppsala model, psychic distance, speed of market penetration
Introduction
The psychic distance postulate (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990) maintains that ﬁrms
start their internationalization on close by markets at a minimal psychic distance, and
gradually move to markets at successively greater distance. Psychic distance, the domi-
nant concept of this study, is deﬁned as factors, such as differences in language, cultures
and business practices, that prevent and disturb the ﬂow of information between the
ﬁrm and the market. As the psychic distance increases, the more problematic informa-
tion ﬂows become. Only through experiential learning can ﬁrms overcome the psychic
distance, and because learning takes time, the internationalization process of new ﬁrms
tends to be gradual and incremental. New ﬁrms tend to start their internationalization
on close by markets, and with increasing commitment and improved understanding of
foreign markets, ﬁrms enter into markets that are increasingly dissimilar to their home
market.
Technology-based new ventures appear to start their internationalization at “close”
markets supporting the psychic distance postulate (e.g., Bell, 1995; Chetty and
Blankenburg Holm, 2000; Coviello and Munro, 1997; Fontes and Coombs, 1997).
However, these ﬁrms do not choose the market according to psychic distance (Bell,
1995; Madsen and Servais, 1997). In Bell (1995), the market selection of software ﬁrms
was more inﬂuenced by domestic client followership, sectoral targeting, and industry
trends, and than by the psychic distance of the market. Madsen and Servais (1997)
proposed that the experience of the founders and partners, as well as the economic and
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capability or customer-related factors determine the location of foreign activities. Ex-
perience, like international working experience, experience in living abroad and other
international experience, may shape the minds of the founders decreasing the perceived
psychic distance (Madsen and Servais, 1997; McDougall et al., 1994), and also shape
their networks and the social capital conveyed by these networks. Overall, the network
approach seems to have merit in explaining the market selection of technology-based
new ventures (Bell, 1995; Chetty and Blankenburg Holm, 2000; Coviello and Munro,
1997; Coviello and Munro, 1995). International opportunities are presented by network
members (Chetty and Blankenburg Holm, 2000; Coviello and Munro, 1997; Coviello
and Munro, 1995) and networks convey information and experiential learning can be
replaced by network learning (Chetty and Blankenburg Holm, 2000).
The objective of this paper is to re-examine the psychic distance postulate of the Upp-
sala Model (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990) in light of recent ﬁndings on technology-
based new ventures. In this paper we make a distinction between the selection of foreign
markets, the time needed to achieve sufﬁcient penetration in foreign markets (i.e., speed
of market penetration in terms of Ayal and Zif (1979)) and the role of social capital. The
model we develop in this paper proposes that the psychic distance affects the speed at
which technology-based ventures penetrate the selected foreign markets. We deﬁne the
speed of market penetration as the time needed from market entry until the generation
of sales income from that market. On far-out markets, the psychic distance increases
the liability of foreignness, which in turn increases the time needed to penetrate the for-
eign market area. Furthermore, the model proposes social capital as a mean to speed
up the market penetration. We deﬁne social capital as the amount and quality of the
external relationships possessed by the ﬁrm and the individuals involved in the ﬁrm.
Social capital may help the ﬁrms to overcome their liability of foreignness on far-out
markets, and thus enables them to penetrate these markets at an increased speed.
We will proceed to develop our arguments as follows. In the next section, we explain
our research methodology and describe the four case companies we selected. In the main
section, we will then build on the case studies and the literature on internationalization
and social capital to develop our revised model of the psychic distance postulate. Finally,
in the last section we will discuss the limitations of our theorizing and the boundary
conditions of the proposed model, before we conclude by describing the theoretical
and practical implications of the proposed model.
Methods
Because our interest was in model development, we chose the case method as our
research strategy. Our choice of the case method was further motivated by our interest
in highly complex processes that take a long time to unfold: this is a type of problem
to which the case method is ideally suited (Yin, 1991). Our approach responds to
the recent calls for case studies in internationalization theory. Jones (2001) called for
studies focusing on more narrowly deﬁned groups of ﬁrms generating rich data, and
Chetty (1997) promoted the case study method showing how it allows researchers to
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study exporting as a dynamic process, not as something static. The strength of case
study method lies in facilitating the study of the internationalization process from
several perspectives, and facilitating a more thorough analysis of each ﬁrm than is
possible in survey research. This enables us to become more knowledgeable about each
ﬁrm, thus allowing new insights to emerge and enabling us to revise the psychic distance
postulate.
We studied the early internationalization of four Finnish software ﬁrms. The evi-
dence from multiple case studies is often considered more compelling and the results
more robust (Yin, 1991: 52; Miles and Huberman, 1994: 29). By looking at a range
of similar or contrasting cases, we can understand a single case ﬁnding, grounding
it by specifying how and where, and if possible, why it carries as it does (Miles and
Huberman, 1994: 29). Multiple cases reduce the risk of reporting chance associations
(Eisenhardt, 1991). We also compared our results to other studies using software ﬁrm
samples (Bell, 1995; Coviello and Munro, 1997; Coviello and Munro, 1995; Rasmussan,
Madsen and Evangelista, 2001), to ﬁnd support for our propositions.
A software ﬁrm sample is particularly suitable for our purpose of examining the
effects of social capital. All our sample companies operate in emerging technology
sector and therefore face the dual challenge of market creation and international ex-
pansion. They are involved in highly knowledge-intensive and interaction-intensive
deliveries for customers situated in more or less dense value networks (Vallee, 2000),
implying an interaction- and network-intensive mode of international entry (Johanson
and Mattsson, 1988). The network approach has been given merit in previous studies
on the internationalization of software ﬁrms (Bell, 1995; Coviello and Munro, 1995
1997; Rasmussan et al., 2001). In this paper, we will build on these studies and the
social capital theory (e.g., Burt, 1992, 1997; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Shane and
Cable, 2002; Stuart, 1999; Stuart et al., 1999; Uzzi and Gillespie, 1999; Yli-Renko et al.,
2001).
Research setting
The company selection criteria deﬁnes the setting of this study and builds a framework
that states under which conditions the particular phenomenon is likely to be found as
well as the conditions under which it is not likely to be found. We selected four case
companies that all represented international new ventures; were under six years old;
demonstrated a strategic intent for early and rapid internationalization; were indepen-
dently held; addressed mainly business customers; and represented variance in terms
of foreign market entry modes employed. To limit variation due to sector-speciﬁc inﬂu-
ences, all case companies were selected from the software sector. This population has
several characteristics that make it particularly suitable for the study of social capital
and internationalization (e.g., knowledge intensity, existence of young internationally
active ﬁrms). Finland is a knowledge-intensive and open market economy, and the act
of going international does not represent a choice of whether or not to do it, but rather,
when. Because the domestic market is relatively small, technology-intensive ﬁrms such
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as software product ﬁrms are forced to go international relatively early in their lives,
and internationalization is an ongoing concern. Focus on a single industry of course
limits the generalizability of our results, and thus our model should be regarded as a
tentative and needing empirical validation.
In the following paragraphs, we introduce the case companies and describe their
internationalization process. The case companies have been given ﬁctive names to dis-
guise their identity. These names are used throughout the empirical sections of the study.
To further protect the company identity, precise ﬁgures are deliberately withheld, and
some information remains secret.
Company A. Company A was established in 1997 to commercialize a benchmark
software developed by another young Finnish software business. From inception, the
ﬁrm has aimed at international markets, and in fact, it has never received any sales
income from the domestic market. The company considers US its main—and only
market area. At inception, it opened a sales subsidiary in UK, which was moved to
Canada a year later and later on to US. Currently, the company has a sales subsidiary
in the US. Company A has always had employees working at foreign locations, with a
maximum of 15 people out of 45.
Company B. Company B was established in 2000. The business idea was to create a
completely new category of treasury-service tools. It sells high-end ﬁnancial packages to
large companies (single-purpose software with cross-business applications). It has been
targeting international markets early on, and has mainly being following a push strategy
targeting potential customers using a variety of lead-generation techniques. Company
B has established two international sales ofﬁces in Europe (i.e., Sweden and UK). It
has not been able to generate signiﬁcant international sales income. In the beginning
of 2002, the company employed 24 people, of whom two were working abroad.
Company C. Company C is the oldest of the four companies, being established in
1996 and employed around 45 people at the time of the study. It develops and markets
software suites for IP-based wireless networks, operating systems, and equipment to
be used by operators and users of future network generations. It has been seeking an
international presence, but its efforts have been unsuccessful. In 2001, it opened a sales
ofﬁce in US to be closer to potential customers and partners. Company C is currently
looking for partners both in Europe and in North America.
Company D. Company D was founded at the beginning of 1999. In less than 6 months,
it had grown to employ 20 persons. It was clear from the beginning that company D’s
main markets were located outside of Finland. It established its ﬁrst international
subsidiary at the age of 17 months old and only four months later it appointed two
new country managers in Europe. This case company was acquired in 2001 by another
Finnish software company. At the time of the acquisition, there were more than 30
employees and almost 30% of the personnel was located outside Finland. At that time,
it derived nearly 90% of its sales income from a single international market area.
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Data collection
In the ﬁrst three cases (A, B, C), the data collection was carried out by the primary
researcher. Most of the data collection on fourth case (D) was done by research asso-
ciates. The advantage of having research associates who had not been involved in the
initial framework development carrying out data collection is the avoidance of con-
ﬁrmatory bias. Additional interviews at company D were conducted by the primary
researcher to supplement the existing material. We followed the internationalisation
process of company A over a period of ﬁve years (1999–2003). The data collection for
the other three ﬁrms was conducted during 2001–2002.
For each case 8 to 12 interviews were carried out, lasting between 60 and
150 minutes. Because a multiple-case study involves cross-case comparison, it requires
some standardization of instrumentation so that the ﬁndings can be laid side by side in
the course of analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 35). The interviews were structured
to some degree—some themes were discussed in every interview, but questions were
open-ended and no priori categorization was used which may have limited the ﬁeld
of inquiry. As the interviews and the analysis of the material progressed, questions
that were more speciﬁc were posed to the interviewees. Following good case research
practice, all interviews were recorded and most were transcribed for content analysis.
Triangulation and repeated visits to same informants were employed to ensure validity
of the data collected.
Relying on a single source of information is not recommended in conducting case
studies. Therefore, secondary source data, such as annual reports, newspaper clippings,
www-pages, was collected in preparation, to challenge interviewees’ memories if nec-
essary, and to crosscheck their ex-post data. The secondary source data reﬂected the
content of the interviews and was used as conﬁrmatory source material. No indepen-
dent analysis was carried out.
Data analysis
Keeping in mind that “our ﬁrst obligation is to understand this one case” (Stake, 1995),
the cases were ﬁrst analyzed separately. For each of the four cases, a detailed description
was ﬁrst prepared. Most of the interviews were transcribed and the transcription and
interview notes were arranged and systematized by themes by the primary researcher.
Although theory-building case research should begin as close as possible to the idea of
no theory under consideration and no hypotheses to test (Eisenhardt, 1989), existing
literature can be used to specify possibly important constructs. Thus, in this study,
some of the themes and constructs were derived from the extant literature; some of
them arose from the case material.
Each individual case study consisted of a “whole” study, in which convergent evidence
was sought about the facts and conclusions; the conclusions from each case were
then considered as information needing replication in other individual cases. The data
analysis proceeded from analyzing within-case data to searching for cross-case patterns
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(Eisenhardt, 1989). This allows the unique patterns of each case to emerge, which in
turn are generalized across cases. Based on the individual case analysis, a preliminary
model was formulated, which was then tested and developed further during the cross-
case analysis.
As suggested by Eisenhardt (1989), three tactics were used to search for cross-case
patterns. First, the dimensions suggested by the theory or current research problem were
identiﬁed and within-group similarities and inter-group differences were identiﬁed.
Second, pairs of cases were selected and similarities and differences listed. Third, data
collected from different sources and of different types were compared. When a data-
source pattern is corroborated by evidence from another source, the ﬁnding is better
grounded (Eisenhardt, 1989: 541).
The revised model of psychic distance
In this section, we propose a model of psychic distance and speed of market penetration.
As described in the introductory section, the proposed model examines the relationship
between psychic distance and the speed of market penetration, and the moderating
effect of social capital on this relationship.
Re-examination of the market selection argument
The main premise behind the Uppsala Internationalization model is that the process of
internationalization is gradual and evolutionary (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990).
Each ﬁrm goes through several logical steps of international behavior, based on gradual
acquisition, integration, and the use of knowledge about foreign markets and opera-
tions, and on successively increasing commitments to foreign markets (Johanson and
Vahlne, 1977). The Uppsala Internationalization model assumes that markets differ in
terms of factors such as language, culture, business practices, education, industrial de-
velopment and political systems. Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) called this dif-
ference the “psychic distance”. Although exceptions commonly occur, the psychic dis-
tance is often correlated with the geographical distance in the foreign-market-selection
process.
The model postulates that as the psychic distance between markets increases, the
more difﬁcult it becomes for ﬁrms to collect and interpret incoming information prop-
erly. Therefore, ﬁrms initially enter markets at a minimal psychic distance, and gradu-
ally move to those at successively greater distance. The speed at which it enters markets
at greater distance is regulated by learning. More precisely, by experiential learning
through the ongoing activities. Because of the tacit nature of market knowledge, the
main source of learning is the ﬁrm’s own operations. With increasing commitment and
improved understanding of foreign markets, ﬁrms enter into markets that are increas-
ingly dissimilar to their home market.
Numerous researchers have challenged the validity of the psychic distance postulate,
ﬁnding that factors other than the psychic distance or the geographic closeness play
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an integral role in the selection of the initial market. Bell (1995), for example found
little support for the psychic distance view in his study on small software ﬁrms in Fin-
land, Ireland and Norway. Sectoral targeting and industry trends were stronger factors
affecting market selection. According to Lindqvist (1997) study on small technology-
based Swedish ﬁrms, market selection was more strongly inﬂuenced by large market
potential and access to advanced customers. Czinkota and Ursic (1991) contended
that the psychic distance was becoming much less relevant as global communication
and transportation infrastructure improved and markets became increasingly homo-
geneous. Bell (1995) also found that software ﬁrms tend to enter those markets where
their domestic customers operate. Networks and social capital have also been found im-
portatn. Network partners provided the trigger for initial market selection in Coviello
and Munro (1995), Coviello and Martin (1999) found that the market selection fol-
lowed opportunities presented by various network members, and Johanson and Vahlne
(2003) report on how existing relationships impact the market selection.
Our case evidence agrees with the studies challenging the original psychic distance
postulate. Of the four case companies, only company D started its internationaliza-
tion on close by Scandinavian markets (i.e., Sweden), but moved shortly thereafter to
European markets (i.e., in the order of entry UK, Germany, Spain, Italy). Three of
the four companies targeted more far-out countries from early on. Company A has
focused solely on the US market. Company B targeted immediately European markets
(UK, Sweden, Norway, in the order of entry). Also company C targeted the European
market area (i.e., ﬁrst Germany, then UK), but it rapidly continued its internationaliza-
tion at far-out markets, opening its ﬁrst ever international sales subsidiary in US. Even
if one restricts the Uppsala model to predict the ﬁrm’s choice of a new market early on,
as suggested by Andersen (1993) and Luostarinen (1979), the psyhic distance appears
not to predict market selection. Early on, without any experience, the case companies
were approaching distant markets.
The case companies listed several factors inﬂuencing their market selection. Com-
pany A approached the US market because it considered the market as the biggest and
most homogeneous, and also because its major technology partners were located there.
Of the case companies, company A has been clearly most focused in its sales efforts: it
only aimed at the US market. It did consider also other market areas, but “only after
the North American market has been well taken care of ”. The ﬁrm is now years ﬁve old
and has generated international sales income only from this market area.
For case company B, the primary inﬂuence on market selection was market potential,
not easiness or low psychic or geographic distance. The company placed most emphasis
on market opportunities, and appeared to know from early on which market had the
best potential for their application. It found the US market unsuitable for several
reasons, including that it was considered to be old fashioned in its application area,
and that it had only limited market potential because most US companies do not have
deal with the problem solved by company B’s software. European countries, particularly
UK and Germany, were considered the forerunners in this application area, and thus
suitable for market penetration. For company D, the market selection was inﬂuenced
by target-market characteristics and the reputational gain the ﬁrm would achieve if it
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succeeded: “if you can achieve market expansion on this market, and you develop your
product there, you can address other international markets in a totally different way than
if you succeed ﬁrst in Finland.”
The market selection factors listed by the companies are similar to those listed by Bell
and Young (1998). In their view, the factors inﬂuencing foreign-market selection had
changed since the mid-1970s when the Uppsala authors ﬁrst proposed the principle.
They posited that the relevance of the psychic distance in the internationalization
process had diminished, and that other factors, such as those related to industry, the
level of foreign-market demand and relationships with existing and prospective clients,
exerted more inﬂuence on initial and consequent foreign-market selections.
Oviatt and McDougall (1997) suggested an alternative explanation asto why early
international ventures appear not to follow the psychic distance postulate. Accord-
ing to Oviatt and McDougall (1997), early international ventures are endowed with
internationally experienced managers, who need not to gain experiential learning of in-
ternational markets. Instead, they can take advantage of their international experience
and target distant markets immediately. This is conﬁrmed by Crick and Jones (2000),
who report that the market-selection decision was primarily based on the managers’
experience in operating in international markets—in other words, on their previous
employment—and the contacts they had developed. Some researchers also propose
that international experience dissolves psychic distance, or at least changes founders’
perceptions of distance to other countries (Madsen and Servais, 1997). Johanson and
Vahlne (2003) discuss how learning and trust building can change perceived psychic
distance. Dow (2000) report how the effect of psychic distance on market selection
declined signiﬁcantly between ﬁrst and second market entry decision. Founders can
compensate for the lack of personal experience by hiring internationally experienced
personnel, who are able to overcome the psychic distance barrier (Coviello and Munro,
1999). The above studies suggest that the impact of psychic distance on managerial de-
cision making decreases with international experience.
Our case evidence supported the experience related explanation. The managers of our
case companies had strong international experience. A few of them had been studying
abroad, whereas others had international work experience. All the managers were open
to internationalization and expressed having an international vision early on. For the
managers, internationalization was a logical step in the development of the company,
and they did not appear to be hesitant or afraid of internationalization and targeting
markets, which differed from the home market.
Case company A is particular interesting, as one of its founders was a foreigner.
Having a foreign founder inﬂuenced signiﬁcantly the early internationalization of this
case company. Its ﬁrst international sales subsidiary was not established on its target
market (US), but it was established at this founder’s home. Later on, as this founder
moved to Canada, the ofﬁce moved with him. Only after this founder left the case
company, it opened a sales subsidiary in the US.
In their discussion on the exceptions of the Uppsala Model, Johanson and Vahlne
(1990) do not account for individual-level experience and knowledge. They do discuss
how ﬁrms can generalize their experience in one market to another if the markets are
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considerable similar. In fact, the Uppsala internationalization process model relies on
ﬁrm routines and the ﬁrm’s environment as the key factors for evolution. Individuals
have been by far neglected by the theory. One could consider that Oviatt and McDougall
(1997) are complementing or adding to the original Uppsala Model in highlighting the
individuals as the level of analysis.
The current case evidence and the recent research ﬁnding suggest that the original
psychic distance postulate is no longer valid. It appears that other factors outweigh the
psychic distance in the foreign market selection decision. Such factors are suggested
by the current case evidence and for example, by Bell (1995).
Psychic distance, liability of foreignness and the speed of market penetration
Internationalizing technology-based new ﬁrms suffer from liability of foreignness. In
a sense, internationalizing ventures are new to foreign markets, because they have no
active presence on the market and are missing a shared history and a shared social
context. In the literature on multinational enterprises (Hymer, 1976), the liability of
foreignness—the costs of doing business abroad that results in a competitive disad-
vantage for an MNE sub-unit—has been broadly deﬁned as all additional costs a ﬁrm
operating in a market overseas incurs and that a local ﬁrm would not incur. Zaheer
(1995) lists four sources of liability of foreignness: (1) costs directly associated with
spatial distance, such as the costs of travel, transportation, and co-ordination over dis-
tance and across time zones; (2) ﬁrm-speciﬁc costs based on a particular company’s
unfamiliarity with and lack of roots in a local environment; (3) costs resulting from the
host country environment, such as the lack of legitimacy of foreign ﬁrms and economic
nationalism; (4) costs from the home country environment, such as the restrictions on
high-technology sales to certain countries imposed on U.S.—owned MNEs.
Our case companies felt that the biggest barriers for internationalization were caused
by the lack of legitimacy and inﬂuence, and the need to learn new roles and establish
relationships. They reported on their perception of foreign markets and market players,
and perceived it to be easier for a fellow countryman/women to make business and
sell products, as the following quotes illustrate: ‘it seems easier for a fellow countryman
to sell to a fellow countryman’. ‘It’s easier for a Swedish company to do business with
a Swedish person, who is located in the nice city of Stockholm and speaks their native
language’. ‘There are cultural differences. You need to have an American to sell to an
American company. A Finnish person just cannot do it. Maybe on the service sector, an
earnest and serious Finn could work’. ‘The German market is a bit complicated. They buy
so willingly German products.’
Technology-based new ventures suffer from a greater liability of foreignness on dis-
tance markets. The more distant the market, the more difﬁcult it is for the internation-
alizing ﬁrm to learn new roles and to ﬁt into the foreign network. Thus, the higher the
psychic distance, the higher is the liability of foreignness faced by the internationalizing
venture on that market. In Grady and Lane (1996) the physic distance manifested itself
among others as the difﬁculty to gain access to suppliers and the necessity to build
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long term relationships. The case companies experienced the psychic distance and the
liability of foreignness in a very concrete manner. The case companies reported that
the time they needed to establish the ﬁrst contact with a potential customer was signif-
icantly longer in far out markets than on close-by areas. On close-by areas they were
also able to use less personal contact methods than in far out markets. ‘Out there. . .
there is so much noise. One needs to ﬁgure out a way to get pass the noise and catch the
attention. You need to know someone who knows someone who knows someone’.
The pace at which an international new venture penetrates a new market area is
affected by speed at which it is able to locate customers and suitable partners, and close
deals. Difﬁculties in establishing international partnerships has been one of the reported
major factors slowing down internationalization (Karagozoglu and Lindell, 1998).
Because of liability of foreignness, internationalizing ventures lack attractiveness in
the eyes of potential customer and partners, because these lack information about
the venture’s competence and reliability. This may be particularly true in the software
industry, which is characterized by abstract products and service, in which quality and
other dimensions are difﬁcult to articulate, and where output delivery is highly coupled
with reputation. Because of lack of attractiveness, acquiring customers and closing
deals takes time, and thus the market expansion is slowed down.
The case companies did report how the psychic distance affected the speed at which
they were able to close business deals. The case companies were able to close business
deals faster in close by markets (e.g., neighbouring countries). On close by markets, the
case companies enjoyed credibility and trustworthiness. On distant markets, the case
companies reported difﬁculties convincing customers of their capabilities and product
quality. The customers were not prepared to deal with a new, unknown and untested
venture or its products.
Furthermore, the value of their reference customers decreased the more distant mar-
kets they approached. The greater the distance between the target market and the origin
of the reference customer, the lower was the value of the reference. On close by mar-
kets, the case companies could lessen the inﬂuence of liability of foreignness by proving
themselves with the help of their domestic reference customers. At distant markets, the
domestic references were useless.
Proposition 1. The psychic distance is negatively related to the speed of international-
ization in terms of speed of market penetration on a foreign market area.
Social capital as moderator of the psychic distance and speed of market penetration
relationship
We propose that social capital inﬂuences the proposed relationship between the psy-
chic distance and the speed of market penetration. For the purpose of this study, we
deﬁne social capital as the amount and quality of the external relationships possessed
by the ﬁrm. On the network level, social capital consists of resources embedded in the
network, such as reputation, credibility, and trustworthiness. In existing literature, the
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beneﬁts of social capital accruing to internationalizing ﬁrms fall generally into two cate-
gories: information and control beneﬁts (e.g., Burt, 1992, 1997; Nahapiet and Ghoshal,
1998) and resource beneﬁts (e.g., Shane and Cable, 2002; Stuart, 1999; Stuart et al.,
1999; Uzzi and Gillespie, 1999; Yli-Renko, Autio and Sapienza, 2001). For example,
Knight and Cavusgil (2004) discuss how internationalising ﬁrms create strong relation-
ships that provide market intelligence and cultivate new buyer segments. Gabrielsson
and Gabrielsson (2003) propose that internationalising ﬁrms utilize horizontal product
and marketing co-operation from the inception. Building on these previous studies on
social capital and on our case evidence, we put forward a model, which posits that
social capital moderates the relationship between the psychic distance and the speed
of market expansion. Technology-based new ventures with social capital can expand
at a higher speed on distant markets than those ventures without social capital. This
is because social capital alleviates the liabilities of newness and foreignness faced by
the internationalizing ventures, thus enabling these to overcome the psychic distance.
Liabilities of newness and foreignness cause information, control, and resource prob-
lems, which social capital can partially solve. In the following, examples of these are
presented from the literature and the case material.
First, internationalizing ﬁrms can use their social capital to access information and
to interpret the incoming information. Information is not spread evenly across actors,
and access to it may well be dependent on social contacts (Granovetter, 1985) and social
relations may provide a vehicle for accessing and disseminating information (Nahapiet
and Ghoshal, 1998). It is often less costly and more efﬁcient than more formal mecha-
nisms, for example tacit information is shared efﬁciently through networks (Nahapiet
and Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). Social capital relates to both the amount
of information potentially available to the ﬁrm and the amount of information actually
disclosed to the ﬁrm. The higher the level of social capital in terms of the number of
ties, the more there are network resources, including knowledge, potentially available
to the ﬁrm. The higher the social capital in terms of the quality of the ties (the more
trusting the ties are), the higher is the amount of knowledge actually disclosed to the
ﬁrm.
We propose that internationalizing ﬁrms may use their social capital to access net-
work foreign market knowledge (experiential knowledge of their partners), and substi-
tute direct experiential learning by indirect experiential knowledge. According to the
Uppsala model, experiential learning is the key factor regulating internationalization
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). In the social capital view, experiential learning can be
replaced by network learning. Firms endowed with social capital can gain access to the
knowledge of other ﬁrms, without having to go through the same experiences as these
ﬁrms. For the case companies, both the domestic and international networks of friends,
previous colleagues, business acquaintances, and ﬁrms were used to obtain informa-
tion. Social capital appeared to create information advantages to our case companies.
They did receive information on international opportunities through their networks,
in similar vein as reported by Lamont et al. (2000).
Second, in addition to facilitating learning and access to knowledge, social capi-
tal also helps the internationalizing ﬁrm to locate foreign partners. Technology-based
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new ﬁrms aiming to internationalize may obtain valuable contacts from their networks
(Coviello and Munro, 1995). Our case companies did rely on their social capital to
identify potential partners. Company A used the network contacts of the international
founder to establish international R&D partnerships, company B found its ﬁrst inter-
national distributor with the help of its domestic customer. In contrast to Luostarinen
(1994), the case companies entered into co-operative relationships early in their inter-
nationalisation.
Third, technology-based new ventures with social capital are also more attractive as
partners and supplier than those ventures without social capital. The search for inter-
national partners is generally characterized by greater uncertainty and risk than the
search for domestic partners. Decision makers, in practice, respond to the inherent risk
associated with internationalization by placing more reliance on their social networks
as a means to economize on these higher search costs (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven,
1996). If the ﬁrm is unknown and its performance is uncertain, the status of the new
ﬁrm and the quality of its outputs as perceived by others depend on the status of other
ﬁrms with which it interacts. Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) pointed out that
partnerships provide legitimacy and market power. In similar vein, Stuart, Hoang and
Hybels (1999) proposed that relationships convey reputation. These researchers found
that prominent relationships helped new ventures to acquire additional, well-known
exchange partners, creating a cumulative cycle of advantage accruing to young ﬁrms
that gain prominent organizational associates. In similar vein, Freeman (1999) showed
that start-up businesses that received support from centrally-connected venture-capital
companies were more likely to attract initial public offering subscriptions. Thus, social
capital as networks and relationships enable technology-based ventures to overcome
liabilities of newness and foreignness in international markets, and to speed up inter-
national market penetration.
Our case companies used their social capital to gain access to foreign partners and
to negotiate cooperative agreements, and speeding up the partnering process. Having
joint suppliers and customers, and industry associations, or being related through an
employee’s professional connections, is sometimes beneﬁcial for partner identiﬁcation
and access. For example, Company A established several R&D partnerships with equip-
ment manufacturers with which the CMO had established connections in his previous
work. In several instances did the case companies beneﬁt from existing relationships
in establishing new ones (e.g., company B with the Swedish software vendor, company
A in establishing new R&D and technology partnerships). In the case of company B,
the negotiations went according to the CEO of company B “quite easily”. Company
B was able to penetrate rapidly the Scandinavian markets after building a partnership
with a Swedish software vendor. Building this partnership was highly dependent on
the social capital, which company B was able to build through its association with its
founding organization.
Social capital did speed up the market penetration of the case companies also by
facilitating access to foreign customers. One manager at company D explained that
the key to rapid penetration into international markets was ‘having the right country
manager with existing networks in each market area. The country managers should have
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the customer contacts already there, so that we could tap into them and use them to our
advantage.’ In Europe, company B was able to use the professional contacts of the
founders to gain access to customers and partners. Using these contacts, company B
was able to start soon after founding negotiations in several market areas. Without
these existing contacts, it would have taken the ﬁrm much longer to ﬁnd the right
customer contacts and to start sales negotiations.
The preceding discussion of case evidence and literature illustrates how technology-
based new ventures can use their social capital to facilitate internationalization. The
beneﬁts of social capital are twofold. The information and control beneﬁts include
improved access to information and interpretation of incoming information. Second,
social capital facilitates identiﬁcation and access to local partners and customers. Con-
sequently, social capital helps the internationalizing ﬁrms to overcome the liabilities of
newness and foreignness, and thus contributes to an increased speed of foreign market
penetration.
Proposition 2. On those distant markets, where the technology-based new ventures has
a high level of international social capital, the speed of market penetration is higher than
on those markets where it has a low level of international social capital.
Discussion
The purpose of the current paper is to revise the psychic distance postulate of the
Uppsala internationalization model. The original psychic distance postulate posits that
ﬁrms initially enter markets at a minimal psychic distance, and gradually move to those
at successively greater distance (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975). Incremental
learning at the level of the ﬁrm is the main factor explaining its internationalization.
Firms are able to overcome the psychic distance by gaining direct experiential knowl-
edge of foreign markets over time.
Based on case evidence, which was supported by recent research ﬁndings, we have
proposed a revised psychic distance model. We found that the psychic distance has
become less signiﬁcant with respect to foreign market selection by technology-based
new ﬁrms. However, we found that the psychic distance has a signiﬁcant negative
effect on the speed of market penetration. Speed of market penetration is deﬁned in
terms of the speed at which the technology-based new ventures establishes itself on
the foreign market, e.g., identiﬁes partner and customers, and eventually obtains sales
income. According to the proposed model, the higher the psychic distance, the slower
the speed of foreign market penetration. At distant markets, the technology-based
new ventures suffer from liabilities of newness and foreignness, which hinder market
penetration because these liabilities cause difﬁculties in the access to information, in the
identiﬁcation of partners and customer, and because they decrease the attractiveness
of the technology-based new venture as a partner or supplier.
Furthermore, the proposed model posits that social capital moderates the negative
relationship found between the psychic distance and the speed of market penetration.
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Technology-based new ventures with social capital can penetrate at a higher speed at
distant markets than those ventures without social capital. This is because social capital
alleviates the liabilities of newness and foreignness, thus enabling the internationalizing
ﬁrm to overcome the psychic distance. Social capital is beneﬁcial in terms of access to
information, quality of information, identiﬁcation of foreign partners and customers,
and it also increases the attractiveness of the internationalizing ﬁrm in the eyes of the
foreign ﬁrms.
Our methodology limits the generalizability of our results. Case studies are gener-
alizable to theoretical propositions, not to populations or universes. In multiple-case
studies, the researcher is generalizing from one case to the next on the basis of a
match with the underlying theory, not with a larger universe. It is possible to generate
mini-generalizations (Stake, 1995), which are generalizations within the cases or across
the four cases. Generalization on statistical grounds is not possible. In this paper, we
have revised the psychic distance postulate of the model based on four case studies
on internationalizing software ﬁrms. This revised model needs to be veriﬁed in future
quantitative studies, and the boundaries of the revised model need to be established.
The proposed negative relationship between psychic distance and the speed of market
penetration has signiﬁcant managerial implications. Managers need to be aware that
markets differ with respect to the time needed to establish a position and to achieve pos-
itive cash ﬂow. Managers need to view market selection as management of a portfolio:
they need to balance the ratio of distant markets requiring a long time perspective and
close by markets offering the possibility of obtaining quick positive income. Because
internationalization is expensive and ventures are likely to need positive income early
on, the ventures should approach close by markets to obtain early income, which then
can be used to ﬁnance internationalization to more distant markets.
Technology-based new ventures have attracted signiﬁcant venture capital invest-
ments and availability of capital has enabled these ventures to target distant markets
and to disregard close by markets. The recent downturn in the venture capital industry
may have an impact on the internationalization of technology-based new ventures, be-
cause obtaining funding has become increasingly difﬁcult. The occurrence of so-called
‘born global ﬁrms’ or ‘instant internationals’ may be reduced by the economic develop-
ments. The economic development may also cause that the internationalizing ventures
increasingly follow the traditional internationalization models. We might speculate
that the international technology-based new ventures will increasingly target close by
markets, because their ﬁnancial resources have become more limited. The economic
development certainly calls for further studies on the internationalization process of
technology-based new ﬁrms.
Our proposed model makes a contribution to the internationalization theories. While
it has been accepted that internationalization may not proceed in distinct and prede-
termined steps as predicted by the Uppsala Model, the basic logic behind the Uppsala
model is arguably still a powerful model of the dynamism within the internationaliz-
ing ﬁrm (Melin, 1992). In this paper, we have examined one of its concepts, psychic
distance, in detail. Our model assumes that this concept is still valid and our case evi-
dence consolidates this assumption. We propose that the relevance of psychic distance
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in the internationalization process has not diminished, contradicting for example Bell
and Young (1998). Nevertheless, we propose that the inﬂuence of psychic distance has
changed, revising the original psychic distance postulate.
The Uppsala model relies on ﬁrm routines and the ﬁrm’s environment as the key
factors for evolution. Recent research on new international ventures has brought the
importance of the individual entrepreneur and social capital to the forefront of inter-
nationalization (e.g., Bell, 1995; Chetty and Blankenburg Holm, 2000; Coviello and
Munro, 1997; Coviello and Munro, 1995; Madsen and Servais, 1997; McDougall et al.,
1994; Oviatt and McDougall, 1994). In this paper, we have revised the physic distance
postulate, bringing in social capital into the internationalization process. Our proposed
model relies on the original concepts of the Uppsala model, but proposes that the in-
ﬂuences and outcomes of these concepts have changed. In this paper, we have focused
on the psychic distance concept, the market entry decision and the speed of market
penetration. We encourage further work on the other concepts and propositions of the
Uppsala model.
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